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The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1949-1950 Term
This symposium, presented for the thirteenth time in the
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW,

examines the main work of the Supreme

Court of Louisiana during the judicial term from October 1949
to September 1950.

I. Private Law
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Joseph Dainow*

DOMICILE

Two unexpected ideas about domicile were expressed recently by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The first idea is that a
"matrimonial domicile," once established, continues after the
separation of the spouses-and conceivably after the departure
of both spouses-as long as no new matrimonial domicile has
been established. In Latham v. Latham,' after the couple had
established a matrimonial domicile in Louisiana, the husband
moved to Mississippi under conditions whereby the wife's refusal
to follow constituted an abandonment. The husband obtained a
Louisiana judgment of separation from bed and board in a contested action; and later he followed up by procuring a divorce.
In appealing from the divorce decree, the wife contended that
the Louisiana court was without jurisdiction for either separation
or divorce because the husband's domicile, and with it the matrimonial domicile, was in Mississippi. The court found that "the
husband attempted to establish a matrimonial domicile in Vicksburg [Mississippi] but was unsuccessful because his wife would
not accompany him to that place."'2 The lower court judgments
were affirmed by reason of "the matrimonial domicile being situ''
ated at Monroe [Louisiana]. 3
The use of matrimonial domicile as an important point of
reference in American conflict of laws cases has been limited to
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1. 216 La. 791, 44 So. 2d 870 (1950).
2. 216 La. 791, 795, 44 So. 2d 870, 871 (1950).
3. Ibid.
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the scope and life-span of the Atherton case, during the Haddock
regime. There has never been any formulation of general principles concerning matrimonial domicile; nor has there been any
legal concept of a continuing matrimonial domicile until replaced
by a "new" matrimonial domicile. The idea in the principal case
has no historical foundation; whether it will have any future
significance remains to be seen.
In the case of Interdiction of Toca 4 another unexpected idea
is the distinction drawn between the "actual domicile, the domicilium habitationis" and the "merely legal or constructive domicile." The question of the jurisdiction of a Louisiana court to
interdict a person whose last legal domicile was in Louisiana
but who has been an inmate of a mental institution for nineteen
years in another state, is discussed elsewhere in this symposium.5
However, the distinction between these domiciles is doubly unexpected: in the first place, because the significance of domicile,
especially in conflict of laws, has always been as a legal concept
(distinguished from the physical fact of residence); and secondly,
because the distinction here made is not borne out by the case
cited as its source." However, the idea in the principal case may
have a different explanation or unexplored possibilities.
CORPORATIONS
Dale E. Bennett*
RECEIVERSHIP FOR MISMANAGEMENT

The protection of minority shareholders includes a special
statutory right to apply for a receivership where minority rights
are jeopardized by gross mismanagement or misapplication of
funds by the officers, directors and majority stockholders.' The
appointment of a receiver, however, is a harsh and expensive
remedy which will not be decreed unless the need for such relief
4. 217 La. 465, 46 So. 2d 737 (1950).

5. See comments on this case in section on Persons (Interdiction), infra
p. 177.

6. In the earlier case of Interdiction of Dumas, 32 La. Ann. 679 (1880),
the court was examining the text of Article 392 of the Civil Code, providing
that "Every interdiction shall be pronounced by the competent judge of the
domicile or residence of the person to be interdicted," and the court there

concluded that this provision "contemplates that such domicile or residence
should be, as a rule, the place of abode of such person, the locus habitationis,
the place where the body can be found and reached, within the territorial
limits of the court itself, and, as an exception, the place of the bona fide
abode, intentional or accidental, of such person within the national boundaries of the sovereignty which the court represents." (32 La. Ann. 679, 682.)
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